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Abstract 11	
Are animals capable of empathy, problem-solving or even self-recognition? 12	
Much research is dedicated to these questions and yet few have considered 13	
how people form beliefs about animal minds. Evidence suggests our 14	
mentalising of animals may be a natural consequence of Theory of Mind 15	
capabilities. However, where beliefs regarding animal mind have been 16	
investigated, this review reveals slow progress in establishing the mechanism 17	
underpinning how this is achieved. Here, we consider what conclusions can 18	
be drawn regarding how people theorise about animal minds and the different 19	
conceptual and particularly methodological issues that might limit the 20	
accuracy of conclusions currently drawn from this work. We suggest a new 21	
empirical framework for better capturing people’s theory of animal mind, which 22	
in turn has significant political and social impacts. 23	
2	
 24	
“The difference in mind between man and the higher animals, 25	
great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind.” [1] 26	
 27	
Thoughts on Animal Thinking   28	
 29	
Scientific debate regarding the existence and nature of mental states in 30	
animals has a longstanding history [2,3] and covers an extensive range of 31	
topics from mirror recognition to numerosity (Box 1). Yet the majority of 32	
people form beliefs about animal minds based on everyday occurrences, such 33	
as when caring for pets [4] or consuming animal products. Understanding how 34	
people construct this “Theory of Animal Mind” (TAM) is therefore likely to 35	
reveal important insights, based on their experience and influence in relation 36	
to animals. Additionally, as a form of internal construal of other minds, 37	
examination of the psychological mechanisms generating TAM will likely have 38	
broad implications on account of behavior interpretation not being limited to 39	
human-animal relationships [5]. However, little research has been dedicated 40	
to exploring the basis on which mental abilities are attributed to nonhuman 41	
animals, despite few doubting the existence of animal mind [6,7]. 42	
Furthermore, when directly questioned, people often substantiate their beliefs 43	
with explanations from personal experience or media sources [7]. As a result, 44	
it is highly unlikely that the psychological mechanisms that contribute to TAM 45	
are analogous to the reasoning used by scientific experts to support 46	
judgements on animal cognition [8]. This mismatch gives rise to several 47	
ethical, scientific and societal issues. Ethical issues arise because views on 48	
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the sentience of different species are correlated with attitudes towards their 49	
use and treatment by humans [9,10]. Therefore, not only is TAM a potential 50	
driver of positive human-animal interactions [11], but also welfare-related 51	
decisions for millions of animals that are currently based upon psychological 52	
mechanisms we know little about. Scientific issues emanate from empirical 53	
approaches to animal cognition, which likely contaminate research design and 54	
produce a biased or inaccurate snapshot of the overall picture of TAM. Social 55	
issues are associated with decision-making in related policy areas such as 56	
animal welfare, food security and climate change that are, understandably, 57	
driven by current scientific opinion. The behavior change envisaged by policy 58	
makers is unlikely to be realised if supporting evidence does not accurately 59	
capture peoples actual thought processes [12,13].  60	
As such, this article is important and timely, and designed to expose 61	
some of the core issues regarding the evidence available in relation to TAM 62	
as well as the research methods commonly used to investigate the 63	
phenomenon. Therefore, we start by identifying, and later proposing, a 64	
candidate mechanism underlying the development of TAM that generates 65	
judgements on the mindedness of non-human animals. Because TAM 66	
involves animal ‘agents’, several theories of relevance from social psychology 67	
are also discussed. Following on from this, we discuss ways in which 68	
research methods might be affecting the results gained from previous TAM 69	
research, and thus pose validity (see glossary) and reliability issues. We 70	
propose a model that allows both conceptualisation and empirical 71	
investigation of the initial stages of TAM using a measurement scale model 72	
(specifically Churchill’s Scale Development Paradigm [14]), which in turn, 73	
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allows mechanisms contributing to TAM to be determined. We conclude by 74	
discussing the importance of reframing TAM in terms of wider relevance to 75	
ethical and policy issues than just animal welfare.  76	
 77	
TAM as a Mechanism of Belief Formation 78	
  79	
Often, people’s views on animal mind have been speculated to reflect a 80	
simple accumulation of various disparate attitudes and beliefs that are often 81	
informed by general society. In essence, we suggest that TAM is more 82	
nuanced. It is based on a belief-generating cognitive mechanism that begins 83	
by drawing on multiple sources of experience and knowledge that are 84	
integrated in order to formulate a judgement (e.g., to what extent is this animal 85	
intelligent?) or belief (e.g., I’m of the view that most animals are intelligent); 86	
the belief/judgement is thresholded, requiring the establishment of criteria on 87	
which to assign mindedness to some species over others. The mechanism 88	
underpinning TAM consists of multiple components (Figure 1), similar to 89	
general models of belief formation [15]. For example, relevant information is 90	
encoded for later use in generating beliefs about TAM. Encoded information 91	
may be descriptive, e.g. chimpanzees can use tools to harvest food, or 92	
inferential, e.g. my dog wags his tail when we play ball, playing ball makes my 93	
dog happy, ergo my dog experiences emotions. These different types of 94	
information become integrated to produce stored schemas or constructs 95	
regarding TAM. People may actively retrieve, or through associative memory 96	
processes are prompted to draw, information from this store as a way of 97	
establishing the certitude of their beliefs regarding TAM [16]. In other words, 98	
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cumulative perceived knowledge/experience from multiple sources allows an 99	
individual to make an estimate that a specified animal possesses a particular 100	
mental attribute that is indicative of TAM. If the estimate reaches a threshold 101	
limit as determined by that individual, the concept of mind is bestowed upon 102	
the animal. This process of belief formation is similar to many models 103	
attributed to other domains [16,17]. Below we consider evidence that supports 104	
speculation on several psychological theories in this mechanism and later, we 105	
outline a framework that helps clarify conceptual and empirical issues when 106	
investigating some of the key components of TAM.  107	
 108	
TAM: Evidence of Influencing Psychological Theories  109	
 110	
Because views on the existence of animal mind are influenced by the 111	
idea of animals as social agents [7], we consider four theories, with origins in 112	
social psychology, and their supporting evidence: Simulation Theory, 113	
Cognitive Dissonance Theory, Terror Management Theory and Social 114	
Dominance Theory.  115	
 116	
Simulation Theory (ST) 117	
 118	
In interacting with social ‘others’, we attempt to make sense of behavior 119	
and predict future actions. Therefore, TAM, as the capacity to attribute mental 120	
states to non-humans, is likely to be influenced by Theory of Mind capabilities. 121	
This is supported by evidence suggesting that, similar to human-human 122	
attributions [18], we confer greater mind to animals as we age [19][11]; most 123	
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likely because we generate more experiences on which to form the 124	
beliefs/judgements, and to specify the details of the criteria on which they are 125	
evaluated. The influence of ToM (specifically as Simulation Theory) is also 126	
supported by people’s use of context and behavioral similarity between 127	
animals and humans as a central factor in the psychological interpretations of 128	
an animal’s actions [20]. Notably, people consider species an important 129	
determinant of animal mind: 72% of survey participants believe chimpanzees 130	
have human-like capacities to feel pain, while only 30% believe worms can 131	
feel pain to a moderate degree [21]. Previously, this has been interpreted as a 132	
cognitive ability being derived from phylogenetic similarity [20], with 133	
evolutionarily more recent animals being seen as in possession of greater 134	
mental abilities [9,22,23]. We suggest this finding is more likely due to the 135	
influence of mental simulation within a TAM mechanism based on the 136	
following evidence: 1) where differences in perceptions of species were found, 137	
results varied in degree rather than kind [20], suggesting we are extrapolating 138	
or ‘simulating’ from a human model, and 2) mirror neuron activation occurs 139	
when people observe both human and non-human animals performing similar 140	
actions [24]. 141	
The idea that people view specific behaviors and then attribute mind 142	
based on this is a common description of how we achieve TAM, and is also 143	
supported by findings that when viewing animal behavior videos, participants 144	
broke down scenarios into specific behavioral ‘event units’ [5]. Despite not 145	
using every event unit to describe the behaviors seen, there was near perfect 146	
agreement on the event unit nature/meaning and the total number present per 147	
video. This evidence suggests that judgements were made based on 148	
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recognition of agent’s discrete actions rather than on their similarity to 149	
humans. 150	
 151	
A note on Simulation Theory as anthropomorphism 152	
 153	
 Skilled mind reading of a human target (in relation to ST) requires an 154	
accurate replication of their mental states, but a simulator’s own mental states 155	
may contaminate this process [25]. Because our interactions with animals 156	
naturally preclude verbal confirmation of inaccurate mental states, it is unlikely 157	
that over time, with more feedback from our interactions, we will develop 158	
improvements in our mindreading. This, combined with the necessity of 159	
simulating within a human mind, means attribution of anthropomorphic 160	
mental abilities to animals is unavoidable (e.g. deception, self-recognition). 161	
However, labelling these errors as anthropomorphic is unhelpful when 162	
investigating TAM. In describing animal minds, people assign psychological 163	
terms to specific shared behaviors, regardless of species [20] suggesting 164	
‘interpretative’ anthropomorphism rather than ‘imaginative’ [26]. Along with 165	
accumulated knowledge and experience, this work shows that we look to 166	
simulate the mind of animals, by assuming that similar actions to our own 167	
reflect similar cognitions. 168	
 169	
Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CD) 170	
 171	
Empirical evidence suggests predominant societal attitudes to meat 172	
eating underpin production animals being ascribed lower mental capacities; 173	
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an attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance arising from this ethically 174	
contentious yet widely adopted societal custom [27,28]. As such, these 175	
mechanisms of dissonance reduction are likely to impact upon TAM and 176	
manifest as opposing correlations between TAM and support for i) animal use 177	
(negative) [19] and ii) animal welfare (positive) [10]. Because criteria upon 178	
which this dissonance reduction is achieved may vary, we consider CD in 179	
relation to TAM as two forms, terror management (TM) and social dominance 180	
(SD). 181	
In individuals with a preference for social hierarchies, dehumanisation 182	
by ridding animals of mind and therefore moral worth [29], allows their 183	
conception as an out-group and subsequent exploitation [6]. For example, 184	
those who support animal experimentation endorse a greater mental divide 185	
between humans and other species [9,30]. Conversely, experimental framing 186	
of human-animal similarity has been shown to increase moral concern for 187	
animals and human outgroups simultaneously [31]. This concept of out-group 188	
dementalization can also be seen in our reduced attributions of mind to pest 189	
species in comparison to other animals [32].  190	
In contrast to our social dominance orientation, which acts to reduce 191	
animals perceived cognitive abilities, mechanisms of terror management aids 192	
dissonance reduction by elevating humans in comparison to other animals. In 193	
order to avoid the cognitive and emotional experiences inherent in awareness 194	
of human or animal death (mortality salience), particularly as a result of 195	
human activity (e.g., farming), we advocate the anthropocentric view that 196	
humans rights be prioritised on the basis of sophisticated cognitive abilities 197	
[6,31,33]. This elevation of own cognitive capacities can be seen in our 198	
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consistent segregation of humans at the top of mental ability scales [22,30] 199	
(for a notable exception see [34]).  200	
However, despite employing different criteria to create distinctions 201	
between human and animal mentality, SD and TM show similarities in that 202	
they likely depend upon the same belief formation processes. In contrast, 203	
simulation theory, and anthropomorphism, are designed to develop criteria for 204	
detecting similarities between humans and animals. 205	
 206	
Theory of Animal Mind: Innate or Acquired? 207	
 208	
Having set out what we propose as a candidate mechanism that 209	
underpins TAM, as well as current theoretical proposals regarding TAM, we 210	
now consider a key question that all theories need to address, namely that 211	
TAM is innate or acquired. In other words, should a special status be 212	
attributed to the formation of TAM? From the theories reviewed, the basic 213	
mechanism of TAM is much like other processes/theories of belief formation. 214	
However, the bank of perceived knowledge the mechanism employs is 215	
subject to several influences that would likely predict individual differences in 216	
the types of beliefs formed. For example, factors such as education [9], 217	
exposure to media [7] and political orientation [35] are likely to cause variation 218	
in TAM. Therefore, despite evidence of similarities across cultures when 219	
ascribing mental states [36], individual and cultural context are likely to affect 220	
the mechanism, as seen in Japanese students who ascribe greater 221	
intelligence to crows compared to other nationalities [10]. However, while 222	
observed variations may be considered the result of social traditions and 223	
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practices, the contribution of specific societal influences on TAM is 224	
unsubstantiated as previous research has predominantly sampled WEIRD 225	
(Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic) populations [37].  226	
 227	
Are there limitations to conclusions drawn from empirical research on 228	
TAM? 229	
 230	
To summarise, the effects of individual and social factors on the 231	
mechanism of TAM is clearly interactive, fluid and warrant investigation. Yet 232	
despite several variables such as age, species of animal and cultural 233	
background being of consequence, based on the evidence we have at 234	
present, the direction and magnitude of effects is often disputed e.g. meat 235	
consumption based on gender. Additionally, even for those factors considered 236	
influential, the variance in TAM they account for is typically small [11,19]. 237	
These issues suggest that research methods may be a potential barrier to not 238	
only understanding the underlying mechanics of TAM but also in clearly 239	
identifying predictive factors. As discussed above, human tendency to 240	
anthropomorphise has received much academic attention, predominantly as a 241	
methodological and individual weakness [38]. TAM research often proposes 242	
avoidance of the former by claiming to purely substantiate beliefs, rather than 243	
test accuracy of knowledge. While valid, this perspective is problematic, 244	
primarily because variation in experience and encoded knowledge is likely a 245	
determinant of beliefs formed [29,39], (as evidenced by the demonstrated 246	
effect of psychology-focused education on TAM [40]).  247	
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In conjunction with this issue, heavy reliance on scale-based methods 248	
may exaggerate the influence of cognitive dissonance on judgements. TAM 249	
research typically presents animals as phylogenetic bands on the basis of 250	
mapping onto confirmed, yet incorrect, evolutionarily linear beliefs held by 251	
non-scientists [30,32,41]. This runs the risk of reducing TAM to a simple 252	
ranking exercise against ‘advanced’ humans. 253	
These methodological problems combine to perpetuate the idea that 254	
TAM is easily explained, prompting a ‘dumbing-down’ of the parameters 255	
investigated. Much research has focused on a single attribute or dimension of 256	
TAM [42,43], perhaps because evidence suggests that there are 257	
commonalities in assigning TAM across the board [44]. This approach 258	
promotes a narrow and unsophisticated demonstration of TAM and distorts 259	
the manner in which variation in knowledge/information is used to consider 260	
the multiple attributes/dimensions on which to assign TAM. If the devil is in the 261	
detail, understanding specific and unexpected results (e.g. 25% of Finnish 262	
people surveyed believe shrimp can remember conspecifics) is surely 263	
imperative [45]. Furthermore, restricting the TAM constructs considered 264	
worthy of investigation not only limits opportunities for understanding but also 265	
assumes an even weighting in the importance of mental attributes. 266	
The consequences of this inflexibility and lack of precision when 267	
employing rating scales is highlighted by use of the ‘belief in animal mind’ 268	
scale [41]. When originally devised, the four-part scale showed high internal 269	
consistency. No subsequent study has managed to reproduce this level of 270	
reliability. This issue could be attributed to views on animal mind having 271	
undergone temporal changes, a credible theory since i) the amount of 272	
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research on animal cognition has increased over time [11] and ii) exposure to 273	
animals via influential media e.g. TV [46] has increased. However, minor 274	
changes to the scale may well be affecting the reliability of findings on the 275	
basis that TAM is more nuanced than previously claimed (for instance, 276	
inclusion of the term “human-like” in surveys appears to reduce participants 277	
willingness to ascribe emotions to animals [40]). Additionally, in its original 278	
use, specific categories of animals were provided (mammals excluding 279	
humans, birds, fish and insects) on a 5-point scale. Much subsequent work 280	
condensed the four groups into “most animals” (a term typically construed as 281	
a mammal [47]) alongside a variety of scale measurements [19,32,47,48] and 282	
subtle changes in wording. This highlights the crucial issues of scale 283	
construction and vague or dual meanings for cognitive terms.  284	
Much research on TAM has hinged on the generalised concept of 285	
intelligence. While this widely used term allows rapid entry into our 286	
frameworks of mind [49], there is often little confirmation of what constitutes 287	
intelligence to sample populations despite evidence that it comprises varying 288	
constructs to different individuals [50]. Intelligence also involves associations 289	
alien to the natural world (e.g. IQ tests). With no specifics to work from, 290	
people may simply execute cognitively accessible judgements of ‘advanced’ 291	
mammals, generating repeated correlations between intelligence and 292	
phylogeny [43]. 293	
We suggest this inconsistency in methods accumulates to produce the 294	
varied reported findings detailed previously. Hence, while regression and 295	
correlation analysis has provided evidence for relationships between TAM and 296	
several other factors, findings have rarely been repeatedly substantiated. 297	
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These discrepancies are understandable on the basis that TAM comprises 298	
different constructs within a study, as well as variation for the different species 299	
on which TAM is being investigated [48].  300	
Taken together, these concerns reassert the need to have precise 301	
scale items for establishing factors that truly influence TAM formation as well 302	
guarding against experimenter bias when designing such scales. As noted, 303	
‘respondents are constrained by the categories provided’ [44], which are often 304	
transferred directly from animal cognition literature to social science studies 305	
[51]. This is acceptable if testing transmission of scientific knowledge is our 306	
aim, but precludes accurate understanding of how we construct TAM. Despite 307	
suggestions that our attributions of emotion to animals aligns with scientific 308	
views of a basic/higher emotional divide, only a minority of participants believe 309	
that animals experience disgust [32]. This demonstrates the importance of 310	
ascertaining specific meanings of participant-generated constructs before 311	
overlaying scientific theory. 312	
 313	
Targeting Issues and Improving Tools of Assessment 314	
 315	
In order to align scale use with meaningful comparisons between 316	
findings investigating TAM, we propose a more focused research programme 317	
examining the construct formation in TAM. To achieve this, we propose a 318	
Reflective Measurement Model [52] (Figure 2). This model would allow 319	
movement away from considering TAM as a single dimension (supported by 320	
the results of [21,35]), allowing greater analysis of the role of specific mental 321	
capacities within an overarching belief in animal mentality.  322	
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We suggest the use of Churchill’s measurement model [14] in order to 323	
generate a valid and reliable model. While full discussion of the model is 324	
beyond the scope of this article, in figure 3 we detail the way in which this 8-325	
step approach to measurement will aid the development of reliable tools for 326	
generating theoretical predictions as well as empirically testing a critical but 327	
often neglected component of the TAM mechanism, namely construct 328	
formation; the way in which knowledge and experience is integrated in order 329	
to formulate constructs that are used to make decisions/judgements, and form 330	
beliefs. 331	
The benefits of this model are that, it would more likely reveal the types 332	
of dependencies that have been speculated over, such as the association 333	
between TAM and empathy. Furthermore, a reliable scale would support 334	
empirical work that continues to employ innovative methods to assess animal 335	
behavior through videos [5,20]. People’s beliefs, judgements and decisions of 336	
animals is context sensitive [23], and so using techniques like this can allow 337	
comparison of how animal mentality may be viewed in both imagined and real 338	
terms. Having a measurement framework that comes with the theoretical 339	
apparatus to generate testable predictions around construct formation that 340	
underpins beliefs, judgements and decision-making behavior, will elucidate a 341	
richer understanding of how we come to our TAM. 342	
 343	
Concluding Remarks and Future Perspectives 344	
 345	
 People’s views of the mental abilities of animals, and the resulting 346	
moral duty for their welfare, have considerable economic, social and political 347	
15	
consequences. Despite this, TAM has received relatively little scientific 348	
attention and the ambiguity in the findings generated from work in this area 349	
may be attributable to methods and tools. More to the point, we propose that 350	
construct formation, a core component of the mechanism of TAM, has been 351	
particularly underexplored. Future progress on the subject will likely be 352	
mediated by the convergence of scientific approaches to determine a wider 353	
range of cognitive constructs (see ‘Outstanding Questions’), a process that 354	
application and examination of the proposed model should aid. Certainly, the 355	
use of validated scale measurements in combination with other methods 356	
would shift focus away from confirming unwarranted assumptions around 357	
TAM. In addition, a richer conceptual framework for generating hypotheses 358	
would improve ways of uncovering people’s assumptions of animal’s mental 359	
capacity. Moreover, focusing TAM research away from seeking correlation 360	
with diverse attitude measures in an attempt to predict human treatment of 361	
animals, would allow exploration of other potentially substantial influences 362	
such as an individual’s history of interaction with specific species. This 363	
redirection is important because TAM is supported by work from many areas 364	
of psychology (e.g. attribution theory, cultural norms, Theory of Mind). In 365	
reducing TAM to a single predictable component within a decision-making 366	
system focused only on humane animal use, we ignore its diverse 367	
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Fig. 1 Proposed Mechanism of Belief Formation underpinning Theory of 573	
Animal Mind. The proposed mechanism is conceptualised as a series of 574	
connected components allowing relevant information to be perceived, 575	
encoded, integrated and subsequently utilised when forming judgements on 576	
the mindedness of non-human animals. Judgements are computed ‘online’ 577	
and represent confidence estimates of belief validity [15]. Formulated 578	
judgements may be integrated into an individual’s bank of perceived 579	
knowledge to be reused in future estimates. Each component of the 580	
mechanism is susceptible to the influence of specified social theories (ST: 581	
Simulation Theory, TM: Terror Management Theory, SD: Social Dominance 582	
Theory, CD: Cognitive Dissonance Theory). For example, we propose that 583	
simulation affects perception and encoding of information relevant to TAM 584	
through recognition of cross-species behaviors/actions. Thus, Simulation 585	
25	
Theory, as a rule, acts to increase the likelihood of exceeding the judgement 586	
threshold required to attribute mind to animals purely as a result of observing 587	
non-human species. This mechanism is seen by the higher levels of TAM 588	
reported by owners towards their pets [53,54]. Conversely, CD, TM and SD all 589	











Fig. 2 Reflective Measurement Model depicting Theory of Animal Mind 600	
as a multidimensional construct. Within this model (indicated as blue), 601	
mechanism of TAM is conceptualised as a second order, latent construct that 602	
underlies multiple first order constructs (dimensions). Dimensions would be 603	
expected to consist of mental traits considered attributes of mind e.g. agency 604	
as seen in [35] (Note: this prediction, based on previous findings, would need 605	
confirming as part of the process). Several specific indicators are used to 606	
capture the constructs. The model acts to provide a way to both conceptualise 607	
and investigate (indicated as purple) the initial stages of TAM development 608	




Fig. 3 Use of Churchill’s model to improve scale development (indicated 611	
as blue). Definitions of TAM are numerous [19] and often overlap, resulting in 612	
conceptual confusion. Step 1 is designed to address this by providing a 613	
delineated definition, thereby improving scale validity and transferability. Use 614	
of Rossiter’s 5 definition rules may aid the definition process [55]. Employing a 615	
multi-item scale would ensure capturing each dimension in its entirety i.e. for 616	
all animals rather than overly broad groups e.g. mammals. Because TAM is a 617	
perceptual attribute/implicit theory [50], it is unlikely that literature reviews and 618	
researcher introspection will generate sufficient scale items [56]. Use of 619	
developmental qualitative research proposed by Churchill would allow rater 620	
consultation in Step 2 (namely the public), improving validity. This is 621	
particularly important because a significant proportion of TAM research has 622	
been based on student populations. Subsequent completion of steps 1-6 of 623	
the paradigm avoids subjective ‘cherry picking’ of cognitive terms [51] and 624	
assumes the generation of a measure that is content or face valid [14]. 625	
Construct validity could then be assessed by a) correlating similar measures 626	
or b) confirmation of the scale behaving as predicted (e.g. can it predict an 627	
associated measure?). Correlation with connected constructs such as 628	
anthropomorphism should be assessed to ensure discriminant validity.  The 629	
final step of developing norms would ensure BAM research extends beyond 630	
the Western demographics typically sampled, an important exercise since the 631	
role of culture has not been thoroughly explored and is likely to influence the 632	
development of TAM [10]. A scenario to illustrate the steps is detailed 633	
(indicated as red). For methods of statistical analysis to support each stage, 634	
refer to [14]. 635	
29	
 636	
Box 1. Scientific Theory of Animal Mind 637	
 638	
Peoples beliefs regarding the nature of mind are typically dualistic, with 639	
mind and body being viewed as separate entities [57]. In contrast, scientists 640	
working in areas relevant to animal cognition predominantly support theories 641	
of materialism, in that all mental phenomena derive from the physical brain 642	
[8]. Additionally, while most individuals consider mind as ‘thoughts’ or 643	
‘consciousness’ [58], among academics, there is no universally agreed 644	
definition of mind, animal-based or otherwise. In combination with the 645	
currently limited understanding of neural correlates of cognitive traits, this 646	
means empirical validation of mental states in animals is problematic [59], 647	
although increasing use of modern techniques such as fMRI promises the 648	
visualisation of neural states/activity such as consciousness [60,61]. 649	
Consequently, scientific views on animal mentality center on examination of 650	
specific mental processes that are i) empirically measurable and ii) 651	
considered meaningful components of human mind, thereby suggesting 652	
comparable mental experiences when evidenced in nonhuman species. To 653	
this end, a range of cognitive capacities have been investigated including tool 654	
use (acknowledged in a range of species [62,63]), numeracy [64] and varying 655	
forms of memory, with evidence of chimpanzees outperforming humans in 656	
short term memory tasks [65] and facial recognition in sheep [66]. Indeed, 657	
mounting evidence hints at unexpected abilities in long derided species such 658	
as spiders, tortoises [67,68] and mice, which recent findings suggest might 659	
experience ownership of their body parts (an aspect of self-consciousness) 660	
[69]. Previously, notions of self-awareness among nonhumans have met with 661	
30	
resistance, particularly because only a few animals (e.g. chimpanzees, 662	
dolphins, elephants) pass the ‘mirror test’, a gold standard for self-recognition 663	
[70,71]. Similarly, when considering the emotional lives of animals, it is noted 664	
that while the ‘nature and range’ of emotional experiences is debated, the 665	
literature widely assumes their occurrence in animals [72]. And yet empathy, 666	
although acknowledged in terms of emotional contagion or sensitivity to 667	
conspecifics [73], is often disputed when defined at the level of perspective 668	
taking [74] or related to Theory of Mind [75]. As such, many capacities 669	
considered integral to human cognition are still contested in the literature e.g. 670	
language, mental time-travel, relational reasoning or mentalising [72,76,77]. 671	
These views may also be bolstered by the historical accumulation of 672	
experimental evidence (as a proxy for widely held scientific belief) favouring 673	
particular animals e.g. primates or dogs [78], despite modern scientists 674	
employing a range of models [79]. Hence, current scientific opinion remains 675	
that animal mentality lies on a varied spectrum with only humans possessing 676	
the combination of complex abilities and thoughts required to generate our 677	




Anthropocentrism: the belief that humans are the most important species in 682	
existence and source of all value, resulting in the interpretation of reality 683	
according to human values, needs and experience.  684	
 685	
Anthropomorphism: the attribution of ‘uniquely’ human characteristics to 686	
31	
non-human entities. Originally viewed as a hindrance to scientific methods, 687	
increasing understanding of animal cognition has generated issues in 688	
delineating anthropomorphism as the unjustified attribution of mental states 689	
vs. interspecies behavior recognition.  690	
 691	
Churchill’s Scale Development Paradigm: an 8-step framework for the 692	
systematic development of multi-item measurement scales when measuring 693	
latent constructs.  694	
 695	
Cognitive Dissonance: a state of tension arising from inconsistent thoughts, 696	
beliefs, attitudes and actions.  697	
 698	
Conspecifics: individuals that belong to the same species. 699	
 700	
Construct: an abstract, psychological concept or variable that cannot be 701	
directly observed (latent) and exists independently of any resulting 702	
measurable phenomenon e.g. intelligence.  Since constructs such as TAM 703	
represent psychological attributes that vary between individuals, 704	
operationalization of constructs should allow for participant involvement 705	
(participant-generated). 706	
 707	
Encoding: the processing and conversion of perceived information into a 708	
form suitable for storage in memory. 709	
 710	
Phylogenetics: the study and taxonomical classification of organisms based 711	
32	
on evolutionary relatedness. Proposed relationships between groups of 712	
organisms, inferred from similarities in genetic or physical attributes, are 713	
presented as a phylogeny or phylogenetic tree. For simplicity when 714	
investigating beliefs, animals are often presented as ‘phylogenetic bands’ or 715	
classes e.g. mammals, birds, etc.   716	
 717	
Reflective Measurement Model: a type of structural equation model that 718	
depicts the relationship between a latent, unobserved construct (e.g. 719	
personality) and its corresponding indicators within a measure.  720	
 721	
Reliability: the degree to which an instrument measures a specified construct 722	
both across time (repeatability) and across scale items (consistency) e.g. test-723	
retest reliability. 724	
 725	
Simulation Theory: psychological theory of mind in which individuals use 726	
their own mind to model a targets mental state, to make inferences about a 727	
target. 728	
 729	
Social Dominance: an individual’s preferences for inequality and hierarchy 730	
among social groups, typically measured using the Social Dominance 731	
Orientation Scale. 732	
 733	
Terror Management: psychological theory that individuals are motivated to 734	
manage the anxiety caused by awareness of death through investment in 735	
belief systems or culture that provide value and meaning. 736	
33	
 737	
Validity: the degree to which differences in observed scores on an instrument 738	
reflects true differences in the variable of interest. Validity may be confirmed 739	
by assessing the ability of an instrument to i) effectively and specifically 740	
measure the theorized latent construct (construct validity), ii) capture all facets 741	
of the construct’s theoretical domain (content validity) and iii) differentiate 742	
between individuals in order to allow the predict future outcomes of a related 743	






• What are the critical constructs that form TAM and in what way are 750	
these are odds with those held by the scientific community? 751	
 752	
• Which mental attributes of animals are considered of greatest 753	
importance when judgments are made about how ethical it is to 754	
consume animals? 755	
 756	
• How do specific cultural influences or practices affect the development 757	
of TAM? 758	
 759	
• To what extent can TAM be considered a distinct psychological 760	
phenomenon rather than the byproduct of other processes such as 761	




• If high order mental faculties form the basis of moral worth, is 765	
anthropocentrism the dominant mechanism in disqualifying objections 766	
to the use of animals that are viewed as ‘of mind’?  767	
 768	
 769	
Trends Box  770	
 771	
 772	
• Current evidence suggests widespread belief in the mental lives of 773	
animals, which has serious consequences for human-animal 774	
interactions. 775	
• The scientific community has been slow to investigate the mechanism 776	
underlying our Theory of Animal Mind (TAM), due to oversimplification 777	
and limited objectivity. 778	
• By expanding the study of TAM to encompass a richer multi-779	
dimensional approach, it is possible to more accurately theorise and 780	
empirically validate investigations of TAM.  781	
 782	
